Today, these issues continue to be some of the main controversies in financing UI. Concern about the potential for financial problems in the system was almost prophetic. The financial condition of the UI system continued to deteriorate and, during the recessions of 1973-75 and the back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s, many states had to borrow funds from the federal government to cover their benefit payments. The situation improved somewhat over the long economic expansion of the middle and late 1980s. However, following this long expansion and a relatively mild recession in 1990-1991, the financial condition of the UI system in 1993 was considerably weaker than at virtually any time since its inception in 1938. 321 One potentially important contributor to the changing financial sta tus of the UI system is the taxable wage base. Over the past thirty years, the rapid rate of price increases considerably eroded the taxable wage base, or the maximum amount of earnings upon which UI taxes are levied. The relatively small growth in the nominal wage base has been considerably more than offset by inflation. Tax rates were required to rise correspondingly to finance higher and higher benefits. The wisdom of this approach is certainly open to question today.
The issue of experience rating has also received considerable atten tion over the past three decades, particularly in the academic literature. Experience rating means that a firm's UI taxes are set so that its tax burden increases as it lays off more workers. The focus of recent research regarding experience rating is its potential effect on temporary layoffs. Because the current financing system is only imperfectly expe rience rated (i.e., additional layoffs do not always result in a higher tax burden), some have argued that this provides firms with an incentive to lay off workers. The financial condition of the UI system will be weak ened if firms follow through on this incentive to a significant degree.
This chapter reviews the financial condition of the UI system, the taxable wage base, and the effects of an experience-rated UI tax. To begin, a brief discussion of the financial structure of the UI system will be presented. This will be followed by a report on the results of an analysis of over fifty years of financial data from the UI system, taking into consideration some of the consequences of a low taxable wage base. The experience-rated nature of the UI tax will then be analyzed. Institutional features that create imperfections in experience rating and the economics literature that has examined the effects of these imper fections on temporary layoffs will be discussed. Finally, conclusions and implications for policy will be drawn.
Financial Structure of the Unemployment Insurance System
The system of financing UI benefits in the United States is con trolled at both the federal and state levels of government. Some aspects of the system are dictated directly by the federal government, and some are determined entirely by the states. This part of the chapter will Unemployment Insurance in the United States 323 briefly describe the role played by each level in financing the system.' A flow chart displaying this information is presented as an appendix to the chapter.
Financing Regular Benefits
To pay for regular UI benefits, all employers are subject to a federal unemployment insurance tax equal to 6.2 percent of their federal tax able payroll. A federal tax credit of 5.4 percent is available, however, for firms in states that have met a series of federal guidelines. These guidelines require that, among other things, states have in place their own tax system with some form of experience rating, charging a lower tax rate to firms who lay off fewer workers. Since all states meet these guidelines, the de facto federal component of the UI tax is 0.8 percent of federal taxable payroll.2 This federal component of the tax is prima rily used for administrative expenses and to pay for the federal share of extended benefits. Federal revenues collected in excess of these expenses go into a trust fund used to finance loans to states whose trust funds have become insolvent.
Although state tax systems are required to meet certain guidelines, these standards are generally quite broad. For instance, the federal tax credit is awarded to firms in states that have an experience-rated tax system, but the type of system employed is chosen at each state's dis cretion. In addition, the federal taxable wage base is currently set at $7,000 per covered worker, but states have the option to set a higher taxable wage base. As a result of the latitude allowed in the guidelines, state tax systems often exhibit substantial differences. The variation across states in taxable wage bases and in experience-rating systems, in particular, is explored in greater detail later in this chapter.
Financing Extended Benefits
Extended benefits (EB), or benefits paid to unemployed workers beyond the regular benefit exhaustion date during periods of recession, are financed differently than are regular UI benefits. The cost of pro viding benefits of this type is split equally by the federal and state gov ernments. As indicated, part of the federal component of the UI payroll tax contributes to a trust fund that accumulates during periods of pros-324 Financing Benefit Payments perity to pay for the federal component of extended benefit costs dur ing an economic downturn. The state component of EB is paid for with reserves in the state's UI trust fund.
This system of financing extended benefit payments became quite important during the most recent recession in 1990-1991. Problems in the methods that trigger EB prevented the system from making pay ments to workers in many locations during the downturn, as described in chapter 6 of this volume. As a result, a stopgap measure, the Emer gency Unemployment Compensation Act (EUCA), temporarily pro vided benefits with the same intent. In those locations where EB had been triggered, states had the option to terminate these payments and to replace them with EUC benefits. The program, however, was financed entirely by the federal government, as opposed to being split by the state and federal governments. As a result, state UI reserves were depleted to a far lesser extent over this period than they had been in previous recessions.
Loans to State Governments
The strain imposed during recessions has often led to insolvency in state trust funds, particularly following the 1975 and 1982-1983 reces sions. To provide assistance in such a crisis, the federal government established a system of loans that can be made to the states to finance these temporary shortages in reserves. When the system was instituted in 1954, it was very generous to the states. States had up to four years to repay the loan with no interest. If the loan were not repaid during that period, payment would be made by reducing the credit allowed against the federal UI payroll tax until the repayment took place. This system amounted to a several year interest-free loan from the federal government to the states. The incentive to borrow eventually became apparent as loans became quite common by the late 1970s; by 1979, 25 states had borrowed over $5.6 billion (Blaustein 1993) . As a result, loan provisions have been restricted over time. The biggest change in the system took place in 1981, when the federal government started charging interest on funds borrowed.
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Trends in Funding and the Taxable Wage Base
The financial condition of the UI system has weakened considerably over the past several decades. This section of the chapter will more fully explore the financial difficulties experienced by the system and then move on to address a potential cause of the problem, a low and largely unindexed taxable wage base. For this purpose, financial statis tics will be examined that are aggregated over all states between the years 1938 and 1993.3 Although each state administers its own UI sys tem and some generalizations may not be appropriate for all states, the decision to use aggregated data is driven by the desire to draw conclu sions regarding the UI system as a whole.
Financial Condition of the Unemployment Insurance System
Over the years, state UI trust funds have fallen dramatically and have become increasingly likely to experience a deficit during a major recession. Figure 8 .1 represents this pattern. It depicts the ratio of the balance in state UI trust funds (net reserves) to total annual wages paid over roughly the past half century.4 This ratio provides an indicator of the health of the UI trust fund, such that larger ratios indicate larger reserves. As trust funds are depleted, the ratio will approach zero, and a negative ratio indicates a deficit in the funds. A strong cyclical compo nent is apparent in figure 8.1, with the ratio of net reserves to wages paid increasing during expansions and falling during recessions. This makes sense because, during an expansion, relatively high employment leads to larger tax revenues and fewer UI recipients while, in a down turn, relatively high unemployment leads to smaller tax revenues and more UI recipients.
The overriding trend apparent in the figure, however, is towards lower fund reserves. In fact, the relatively large recessions of 1975 and 1983 led many state funds to run deficits that required loans from the federal government to pay for UI benefits. The extent of the problem was so severe in 1983 that the aggregate of all state trust funds was in deficit. Prior to this, state trust funds never came close to running out of money.
Many changes were made over the last two decades in an attempt to restore solvency to the system. In 1981, the federal government pro- , 1938-1993 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 vided a strong incentive to states to keep their individual UI trust funds solvent by legislating that interest would be charged on future loans. To reduce UI expenditures, some states restricted eligibility so that fewer people could receive benefits. In addition, in the highly inflationary period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, many states did not increase UI benefits, leading to a benefit cut in inflation-adjusted dollars. In New York State, for example, the ratio of average weekly benefits to average weekly wages, sometimes referred to as the replacement ratio, fell from 0.326 in 1979 to 0.279 in 1982.
The biggest change in the states, however, was observed in the tax rates assigned to the payrolls of employers. The time series of the aver age employer tax rate is depicted in figure 8.2. Again, a strong cyclical pattern is observed in this figure. During and just after a recession, tax rates rise to cover the additional liabilities accrued by the system dur ing the downturn. Ignoring the cyclically, the trend is towards higher tax rates since the early 1950s. For example, the average employer tax rate (as a percentage of taxable payroll) following the economic expan sion of the late 1960s and early 1970s was under 1.5 percent. In 1990, after another long expansion, the average rate was about 2 percent.
The increase in average tax rates masks some of the variability across firms. Those firms at the maximum tax rate have faced a large rise in tax payments. This pattern in the data can be seen in figure 8 .3, which represents the average tax schedule for states employing the reserve ratio method of financing over the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] . The beginning and end points of this time span follow the end of a major recession by a few years and represent roughly comparable points in the business cycle. The schedules show that there has been a secular increase in tax rates for those firms who lay off a lot of workers, lead ing to a negative reserve ratio. The maximum rate increased from about 4.5 percent in 1978 to almost 7 percent in 1987.5 There has been some change in tax rates faced by firms with lower reserve ratios, but there is no obvious pattern to these changes. The conclusion apparent from this figure is that states have attempted to recoup some of their increased UI expenditures from the firms with the greatest layoff history.
Although these changes have improved the financial picture of the UI system over the past decade, its condition is still relatively weak by historical standards. Referring back to figure 8.1, the economic expan sion of the middle and late 1980s restored UI trust funds to a level not Rates, 1938 Rates, -1993 Rates, 3.5 1938 Rates, 1943 Rates, 1948 Rates, 1953 Rates, 1958 Rates, 1963 Rates, 1968 Rates, 1973 Rates, 1978 Rates, 1983 Rates, 1988 Rates, 1993 330 Financing Benefit Payments seen since 1974. The mild recession of 1990-1991 led to a relatively small reduction in the size of the fund.6 However, a severe recession could again lead to insolvency in many states. Reductions in the trust find equal to those encountered in either the 1973-1975 or 1981-1982 recession would once more exhaust aggregate reserves in state UI trust funds.
The Taxable Wage Base
The taxable wage base is another component of the UI financing system subject to federal regulation. The federal government sets a minimum wage base, currently $7,000, which must be met by all states. Thus, employers only pay UI taxes on the first $7,000 of each worker's earnings. States have the option of setting a taxable wage base above the federal minimum. In 1994, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia elected to set a higher taxable wage base, although it was $11,000 or less in 24 of these states (the level of the tax base for each state is presented in table 8.1). In addition, seventeen states have indexed their wage base, usually as a fraction of the average earnings level in the state. Most of the bigger states, however, have not done so. For example, the wage base in New York, California, and Florida is $7,000, while the wage base in Texas and Illinois is $9,000.
With the exception of the minority of states that have indexed their taxable wage base, adjustments are generally made in an ad hoc man ner; without legislation specifying an increase, the wage base remains constant. Adjustments have only been made sporadically since it was first established in 1939, and inflation has severely eroded its real value. In 1940, the taxable wage base was set at $3,000, equal to aver age annual earnings at that time. After adjusting for inflation, this base would provide roughly $31,000 worth of buying power today, which is about four and one-half times the current $7,000 wage base. Moreover, this method of financing stands in stark contrast to that of the social security system, where legislation was first passed in 1972 to automati cally adjust its taxable wage base to keep pace with inflation. In 1940, the base in the social security system also equaled $3,000. As of 1972, the social security taxable wage base had climbed to $9,000, and the UI taxable wage had risen to $4,200. Today, the comparable figures are $53,400 and $7,000 for social security and UI, respectively. These patterns are shown in figure 8 .4, which presents the fraction of covered earnings taxable by both the UI and social security sys tems. Throughout the 1940s, both systems taxed the same proportion of earnings. A series of ad hoc adjustments to the social security tax able wage base in the 1950s and 1960s maintained the wage base at a roughly constant level while the UI wage base continued to fall. Indexation and other tax increases actually raised the relative size of the Social Security taxable wage base while a few ad hoc increases only temporarily slowed the continued decline in the 1970s and 1980s in the UI system.
Problems with the Current System
A major deficiency in the current system of UI financing is that the infrequent, ad hoc adjustments to the taxable wage base lead to a con tinual erosion of its financial stability. The problem rests in a few sim ple accounting identities:
1. revenues collected are equal to the product of the tax rate and tax able wages paid in the state, 2. benefits paid out are equal to the product of the number of unem ployed, insured workers and the amount of benefits they collect, and 3. if the benefits paid out exceed the revenues collected, the balance in the UI trust fund must fall.
Even in the absence of severe cyclical downturns, these basic relation ships indicate that the current system of UI financing will drift towards insolvency. This is because benefit levels, for the most part, rise to keep pace with inflation, but taxable wages do not. As a result, benefit pay ments will continually increase more than revenues do and the trust fund will persistently decline. Short-term benefit reductions, penalties imposed for borrowing, and short-term tax rate increases cannot solve this problem in the long run. Moreover, this difficulty is unrelated to the outcome of the debate regarding the merits of a "forward-funded" UI system (i.e., a system that finances large benefit payments made during recessions by accumulating large reserves during booms rather than by borrowing), discussed in chapter 9 of this volume. Regardless Figure 8 .4 Fraction of Covered Earnings Taxable by UI and Social Security, 1938-1993 Social Security 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 of the level of trust fund reserves deemed adequate, the accounting identities suggest that reserves will slip lower and lower and will even tually fall below that level.
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To illustrate these concepts, figure 8.5 displays one measure indicat ing the generosity of UI benefits and one measure indicating the tax bur den imposed on workers' wages, where both measures are aggregated across states. The generosity gauge is the ratio of average weekly bene fits to average weekly wages.7 It expresses the fraction of the average worker's wage that would be replaced by the average weekly benefit and is therefore sometimes called the replacement ratio. The tax burden gauge is the ratio of taxable wages to total wages paid in the state. It indi cates what fraction of wages earned are taxed by the UI system. Figure 8 .5 shows that the generosity of UI benefits has remained fairly constant over the past fifty years. The average weekly benefit would replace roughly one-third of the average worker's weekly wage. This figure also indicates, however, that the fraction of wages taxed by the UI system has fallen dramatically. While virtually all wages paid were taxable fifty years ago, only around one-third are currently tax able. The decline in this ratio is a result of the increase in total wages paid at roughly the rate of inflation while taxable wage growth has been restricted due to the small and infrequent increases in the taxable wage base. The discrete rises in this ratio in 1972, 1978, and 1983 cor respond exactly with federally mandated increases in the taxable wage base. This pattern in the UI taxable wage base stands in stark contrast to the experience of the Social Security system.
The evidence presented in the figure suggests that, while the real generosity of the UI system has been largely constant over time, the tax burden falls almost unabatedly. Therefore, the simple accounting rela tionships clearly indicate that the system must move towards insol vency unless changes are made. Increasing tax rates continually is one approach to providing adequate funding for the system, even in the presence of a taxable wage base that is relatively constant in nominal dollars. Increasing tax rates can maintain the basic accounting identi ties if rates are raised fast enough to keep pace with the inflation adjustments made to UI benefits. In fact, a pattern like this has taken place over the past two decades, as shown in figure 8.2 and 8.3, and as discussed earlier in the chapter. This approach, however, creates differ ent problems, which are explored in the following section. 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 336 Financing Benefit Payments
Tax Rates and Low-Wage Workers
A payroll tax that only applies to earnings up to a specific level results in a greater proportion of earnings being taxed for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers. Both social security and UI taxes share this feature, whose effect depends upon the incidence of the pay roll tax.8 If the tax is paid largely by firms, it provides a disincentive for firms to hire relatively less skilled workers. If the tax is passed along to workers in the form of lower wages, it is a form of regressive taxation. Either way, low-wage workers are hurt disproportionally by this type of tax.
The problem with the UI tax is that it has historically had a roughly constant taxable wage base and an increasing tax rate. As the taxable wage base is eroded by inflation, only lower-and lower-wage workers remain taxed on all or most of their earnings. Similarly, the taxable wage base becomes a very small part of a high-wage worker's earnings as wages grow with inflation. Therefore, the additional burden of the tax borne by low-wage workers is growing over time.
Again, historical characteristics of the UI system aggregated across states will illustrate this point. Table 8 .2 considers three hypothetical workers: one is a low-wage earner (making $5,000 per year in current dollars), one is a moderate-wage earner (making $25,000 per year in current dollars), and the third is a high-wage earner (making $75,000 per year in current dollars). The Consumer Price Index is used to con vert these dollar amounts to comparable levels of purchasing power in 1954, 1969, and 1989 . These years are chosen because they all repre sent low points in tax rates following an extended economic expansion. Using the historical tax rates and the federally mandated taxable wage base for those years, an estimate is obtained of the percentage of each worker's income paid to UI taxes.9
The results presented in table 8.2 demonstrate quite clearly the increasing tax burden faced by low-wage workers or by the firms that employ them. In 1954, a firm employing a low-wage worker paid 1.12 percent of the individual's wage as UI taxes, about five times the per centage (0.22) paid by a firm employing a high-wage earner. A firm employing a moderate wage earner paid 0.65 percent. Regressiveness in the system grew somewhat during the relatively low inflation years between 1954 and 1969. In the latter year, the tax burden for a low-wage worker increased slightly to 1.38 percent, while the high-wage worker's burden fell to 0.2 percent, one-seventh the rate for the lowwage worker. The middle-wage worker's tax burden stayed roughly constant. By 1989, however, the inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s led to vastly different tax burdens. The tax imposed upon a firm employing a low-wage worker increased to 2.18 percent of his/her earnings. This is about 20 times the percentage paid by a firm employ ing a high-wage worker, which dropped to 0.09 percent. Between 1954 and 1989, the tax burden facing low-wage workers doubled, while the burden facing high-wage workers was cut in half. Thus, disproportionate costs may be borne by low-wage workers or by the firms that employ them as a result of the historical pattern of maintaining a relatively constant taxable wage base while increasing tax rates to finance inflation-adjusted benefits. Low-wage workers either become more and more expensive employees relative to highwage workers or are subject to an increasingly regressive tax, depend ing upon the incidence of the tax. This effect will continue until the taxable wage base is indexed.
Experience Rating and Employment Fluctuations
Another area in which state financing systems differ is in the way they implement experience rating. Recall that an experience-rated state tax system is required for firms to take a credit against the federal UI tax. The method by which taxes are experience rated, however, is left to the discretion of the states and has led to differences across states. This part of the chapter will explore the various types of systems used and will then proceed to review the evidence regarding claims that the current system provides firms with an incentive to lay off workers.
State Tax Systems
The two most common ways of computing the tax rate a firm will be charged are the reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods. Financing sys tems of these types are in place in thirty-three states and seventeen states, respectively. The remaining states have systems that are less common and will not be described here. 10
Under a reserve ratio financing system, a "bank account" is estab lished for each firm, with tax payments added to the account and UI benefits drawn from it. The reserve ratio is the ratio of the reserves in the firm's account to the average taxable payroll of the firm over, typi cally, the past three years. Firms with a high reserve ratio have contrib uted considerably more in taxes than they have paid out in benefits. In contrast, firms with a negative reserve ratio have paid out more in ben efits than they have paid in taxes.
Tax rates are assigned according to a tax schedule that relates a firm's reserve ratio to a specific tax rate. A simplified version of a tax schedule is presented in figure 8.6. A firm's UI tax rate is a decreasing function of its reserve ratio, subject to a minimum and a maximum rate. When a firm lays off workers, the benefits paid to that worker are charged to the firm's account. Its reserve ratio, therefore, falls. For a firm with a "moderate" reserve ratio (i.e., those firms located on the sloped portion of the tax schedule) laying off an additional worker will increase its tax rate. This represents the experience-rating feature of the UI tax system. On the other hand, if the firm lays off enough workers, its reserve ratio will fall beyond the point where the tax rate rises above the maximum rate. At this point, laying off more workers will not lead to an increase in the tax rate charged to the firm. Moreover, a firm that lays off relatively few workers and has a high reserve ratio will still pay the minimum tax rate if it lays off an additional worker. It is for these reasons that the system is said to be imperfectly experience rated. Tax rates in a benefit ratio system are more directly linked to the level of benefits received by a firm's laid-off workers. This system ties a firm's UI tax rate to the ratio of the benefits drawn by its employees, typically over the past three years, to the size of its taxable payroll dur ing those years. A tax schedule then relates the firm's benefit ratio to a tax rate that it must pay. The tax schedule is similar in nature to that presented in figure 8.6, with the obvious exception that the benefit ratio rather than the reserve ratio belongs on the x-axis. Again, moderate layoff firms face tax rates that increase with their layoff experience. The existence of a minimum and maximum tax rate indicates that the system is only imperfectly experience rated.
Across states, tax levels vary dramatically. Table 8 .3 presents the minimum, maximum, and average tax rates for all states in 1993. Max imum tax rates range from 5.4 percent in several states (the minimum allowed by federal law) to 10 percent in Michigan. Average tax rates range from 0.5 percent in South Dakota to 4.8 percent in Pennsylvania and New York.
Tax Systems and Experience Rating
In describing the reserve ratio and benefit ratio systems, the feature of imperfect experience rating shows up quite clearly because of the presence of the minimum and maximum tax rates. Imperfect experi ence rating creeps into the system in more subtle ways as well. This section will more fully explore this aspect of the tax system.
One method of assessing the degree of experience rating across states is the Experience Rating Index (ERI). This measure takes into account benefits paid out that do not increase the tax imposed upon firms because (a) the firm is at the minimum or maximum tax rate (ineffectively charged benefits), (b) the firm is no longer operating in the state (inactive charges), or (c) the benefit payments are not charged back to the employer's account for some other reason (noncharged benefits). Noncharged benefits may result, for instance, if a state elects to make payments to workers who quit their job after a disqualification period or if the payments represent extended benefits. Formally, the ERI is computed as ERI = 100 -%IEC + %IAC -I-%NNC where %IEC represents the percentage of benefit payments that are ineffectively charged benefits, %IAC indicates the percentage of bene fit payments that are charged to inactive firms, and %NNC is the per centage of payments that are not charged to firms. An ERI of 100 indicates that all benefits are charged to firms and that the degree of experience rating is complete. An ERI of zero would show that no ben efits are charged to firms and that there would be no experience rating. Table 8 .4 presents the ERI and its components for all states in 1994. A significant degree of variation is present in these data. For example, the ERI in North Carolina is only 31 percent compared to 84 percent in New York. Although the ERI is a comprehensive source of data regarding the current status of experience rating, it does have some limitations, as highlighted by Vroman (1986 Vroman ( , 1994 . First, the ERI is just a snapshot of the relationship between benefit payments and tax liabilities. It does not take into account the fact that benefits incurred today will lead to higher future tax payments by experience-rated firms. Second, the lag between benefit charges and tax increases leads to cyclically in the ERI. When a recession begins, benefit charges increase, but taxes for experience-rated firms do not rise until the following year. Therefore, the fraction of benefits that are ineffectively charged will appear to increase. At the end of the recession, this lag will lead tax payments to grow more rapidly than benefit payments and will reduce the ERI. This cyclical component has nothing to do with structural changes in the UI financing system and may provide policy makers with misleading data.
Recent empirical research in the academic literature has utilized an alternative indicator of the degree of experience rating a firm faces through a concept called the marginal tax cost (MTC). The MTC is designed to measure the additional tax burden for a firm if it lays off a worker and that worker receives one dollar in UI benefits. For firms at the minimum or maximum tax rate in either type of system, the MTC is zero since tax rates would be unaffected. For firms between the minimum and maximum rates, however, the MTC is probably not equal to unity (i.e., the firm's tax burden will not increase by one dollar) in either the reserve ratio or benefit ratio financ ing systems. Consider a firm in a reserve ratio state that has constant employment. 11 If this firm is located along the sloped portion of the tax schedule and it pays out a one-dollar UI benefit, its reserve ratio will fall and its taxes will increase in the following year. If the additional tax liability in the next year is less than one dollar, then the firm will not have yet fully repaid the dollar in benefits. Its reserve ratio will still be higher than it was before the benefit payout and it will again face a somewhat higher tax rate in the following year. This pattern will repeat itself until the full dollar is repaid.
Although full repayment would indicate perfect experience rating, that repayment may have taken place over several years. Therefore, the present discounted value (PDV) of the additional taxes paid will actu ally be less than one dollar, indicating imperfect experience rating. Since the "imperfection" rests in the PDV calculation, two factors that influence the degree of experience rating become apparent. First, the slope of the tax schedule will influence how quickly the dollar is repaid. If the slope is steep, the dollar will be repaid more quickly and the MTC will be closer to unity. 12 Second, the interest rate used in the PDV calculation will influence the MTC. Higher interest rates will reduce the degree of experience rating.
This approach to Calculating the MTC and incentives for firms is based upon a small change in benefit payments that is, perhaps, appro priate in examining temporary layoffs. A reduction in the size of a firm's workforce through permanent layoffs, however, may similarly be subsidized by the UI system. Brechling and Laurence (1995) point out that large changes in employment not only alter the tax rate, but the size of the payroll upon which that tax has to be paid. Because the total tax burden decreases in response to such downsizing, they argue that this type of system encourages firms to lay off workers in this context as well. Limited empirical research has considered the response of employers to this incentive, and the remaining discussion will focus on the effect of experience rating on temporary layoffs.
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Experience Rating and Temporary Layoffs
The employment effects of imperfect experience rating have gener ated a significant amount of research over the last two decades. The approaches taken to examine this issue have developed considerably over the period and will be summarized in this section of the chapter. The survey provided here is not intended to be complete but is pre sented as an overview of developments in the literature. Previous sur veys can be found in Brechling (1977) , Topel and Welch (1980) , and Hamermesh (1990) .
Theoretical foundations for this research were laid by Feldstein (1976) , Baily (1976), and Brechling (1977) . The effect of imperfect experience rating on layoffs was addressed in the context of an implicit contract model. In this type of model, there is some form of long-term attachment between firms and workers. Imperfect experience rating leads to layoffs because layoffs are subsidized. If a firm lays off a worker, the UI benefits received by that worker are greater than the additional tax costs faced by the firm. If firms and workers have a longterm attachment, both firms and workers can benefit from this subsidy if the firm cycles workers through temporary spells of unemployment. The firm will benefit because it can pay the workers a little less. Work ers will benefit because their total compensation, equal to wages and UI payments, will be higher. Therefore, firms will use temporary lay offs to extract the subsidy regardless of demand conditions, but partic ularly during periods of low demand.
Initial attempts to empirically test this proposition typically ana lyzed the effects of differences in parameters of the UI system on lay offs. Feldstein (1978) used microdata from the 1975 Current Population Survey to examine the probability of being on temporary layoff on the survey date as a function of the average weekly UI benefit in the worker's state. Since the absolute size of the subsidy created by imperfect experience rating grows with the benefit level, he hypothe sized that benefits should be positively correlated with the probability of temporary layoff. The results from Feldstein's analysis supported this hypothesis and led to the conclusion that a large share of tempo rary layoff unemployment is created by imperfect experience rating. Brechling (1981) used aggregate industry level data by state for the years 1962-1969 to examine the impact of parameters of the tax sched-ule itself, such as the maximum tax rate and the slope. As discussed earlier, a higher maximum or a steeper slope will increase the degree of experience rating and should reduce layoffs. Support for this relation ship is observed, particularly in response to differences in the maxi mum tax rate.
The next major advance in this literature came in a series of papers by Topel (1983 Topel ( , 1984 Topel ( , 1985 . A significant contribution made by Topel was his parameterization of the degree of experience rating. Rather than bringing specific components of the UI system into his empirical work, Topel introduced the concept of the marginal tax cost, measuring the amount of a one-dollar benefit that is repaid by the firm in the form of higher taxes. This parameterization provided a convenient approach to observing that experience rating is imperfect even for firms between minimum and maximum tax rates. Moreover, it provided a useful way to simulate what would be the effect on temporary layoffs if the experi ence rating were complete. Changing the MTC from its current level to unity would approximate the effects of instituting a UI system with perfect experience rating.
Topel's research computed the degree of experience rating aggre gated across firms in twenty-nine different industries for several states and a few years. Using microdata from the Current Population Survey, he estimated models of the probability of being on temporary layoff as a function of the MTC. Findings from this research uniformly showed that workers employed in states and industries with a lower degree of experience rating were significantly more likely to be temporarily laid off. Movement from the current system to one with complete experi ence rating would lead to approximately a one-third to one-half reduc tion in temporary layoff unemployment, according to Topel's estimates.
A problem with the research completed to this point was that it ignored the effects of imperfect experience rating on layoffs at differ ent times in the business cycle. The theoretical literature based on implicit contract models indicated that an effect should be observed in all periods but that it should be stronger during cyclical downturns. The next advance in this literature explicitly incorporated differences over the business cycle in the analyses.
The theoretical basis for much of this work also changed from an implicit contract model, stressing long-term attachments between firms Unemployment Insurance m the United States 349 and workers, to adjustment cost models that place importance on the costs of changing the size of a firm's workforce (Anderson 1993; Card and Levine 1994 ). An experience-rated UI tax is treated as an adjust ment cost. Firms that want to reduce the size of their workforce will have to incur a greater firing cost the greater the degree of experience rating. Importantly, firms that want to hire workers must also take this cost into consideration because they will face a higher cost should they decide to lay off those workers sometime in the future. Therefore, not only does a greater degree of experience rating reduce the incentive to lay off workers during an economic downturn, it reduces the incentive for firms to hire workers during an expansion. In other words, the greater the degree of experience rating, the less the variability in employment over the business cycle. This pattern is depicted in figure  8 .7.
Depending upon the data set employed, there are significant differ ences in the empirical tests of this proposition. Card and Levine (1994) use 10 years of data from the Current Population Survey; estimate MTC measures by state, industry, and year; and assign these measures to each individual in the sample. Their approach is similar to the one taken by Topel, except that they explicitly model the effect of the MTC on temporary layoffs in each year over the 10-year span from 1978-1987, which included a severe recession and two periods of economic growth. They find that imperfect experience rating may be linked to as much as 50 percent of temporary layoffs during the recessionary years of 1982-1983, but that there are considerably smaller effects at the peak of the business cycle in 1979 and 1986-1987 . Similar results are observed for temporary layoffs over seasonal patterns of employment demand throughout the year. The advantage of the approach employed by Card and Levine is that it utilizes a largely nationally representative source of data over a long time period.
An alternative approach, implemented by Anderson (1993) and Anderson and Meyer (1994) , is to use the information available in a unique source, the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) data. The CWBH represents quarterly UI administrative records on firms and individuals in eight states between 1978 and 1984. The advantage of this data source is that an MTC measure can be created for individual firms and can then be applied to the employees of that firm. Although use of the CWBH data allows for firm-level analysis, it
introduces other problems; results may only pertain to those states included in the survey and may not be nationally representative, and personal characteristics are not available in this data source and cannot be controlled for in the empirical work. Using a subsample of firms in the retail trade industry from the CWBH data, Anderson (1993) examines the cyclical pattern of employment over a quarterly demand cycle as a function of the indi vidual MTCs of the firms. Consistent with an adjustment cost model, she finds that the peak-to-trough change in employment levels is smaller among firms that face a higher MTC (i.e. a greater degree of experience rating). Over the entire cycle, employment is shown to be slightly higher in firms facing a higher MTC.
Quite recently, Anderson and Meyer (1994) have used the CWBH data to carefully examine two potential problems that may have affected previous empirical work. First, they consider problems that may be present in the work by Topel (1983 Topel ( , 1984 Topel ( , 1985 and Card and Levine (1994) , who utilize measures of the MTC evaluated at the state/ industry level. Previous research indicates that this approach masks a considerable degree of variability occurring across firms within states and industries (Anderson and Meyer 1993) and may result in biases in the estimated impact of imperfect experience rating. The results pre sented by Anderson and Meyer indicate that aggregation has only a small impact on the estimated effect of imperfect experience rating on temporary layoffs.
Possibly a more important problem addressed by Anderson and Meyer (1994) is the potential endogeneity of the MTC cost measures in models of temporary layoffs. 13 Since a firm's MTC is determined by its past layoff history, previous empirical models have estimated how temporary layoffs are affected by MTC, which is a function of lagged temporary layoffs. Serial correlation in a firm's layoff history will therefore lead to endogeneity bias. Moreover, in prior research estimat ing MTC measures aggregated to the state level, state tax schedules may have shown a response to the aggregate layoff behavior of firms in the state. If firms lay off many workers, state tax schedules may adjust to provide the necessary revenue to pay for the additional benefits. 14 Anderson and Meyer find that, even after controlling for this source of bias, over 20 percent of temporary layoffs can be attributed to imper fect experience rating.
Financing Benefit Payments
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has addressed two major developments in UI financing since Haber and Murray's 1966 volume. First, the financial condition of the system has been examined, along with the role that the structure of the taxable wage base has had on this condition. The system was shown to be financially weak and subject to insolvency should a major recession occur. Moreover, the low taxable wage base, which is mainly constant in nominal dollars, will continue to threaten the financial sta bility of the system unless continually rising tax rates provide an offset. This alternative may produce the necessary funds but will require the system to place a larger and larger tax burden on low-wage workers.
These factors highlight the need to index the taxable wage base. 15 Although an increase in the wage base before instituting indexation may be desirable to help assure the solvency of the fund, it appears that such a tax increment would be impossible in the current political envi ronment. Indexation, on the other hand, is not a tax increase; it merely prevents inflation from eroding the current tax base.
The second goal of this chapter was to examine the effects of imper fect experience rating on temporary layoffs. The literature addressing this issue has developed considerably over the period. Additional econometric problems, more complicated statistical techniques, and more detailed data have emerged. However, empirical results have been remarkably consistent; a movement to a financing system with perfect experience rating will eliminate 20-50 percent of all temporary layoffs. Although there is relative consistency in these findings, recent evidence indicates that increasing the degree of experience rating will not come without a price. Treating the UI tax as an adjustment cost, it becomes clear that fewer layoffs during a downturn in economic activ ity may be matched by fewer new hires during periods of economic expansion. Some empirical research has supported this view.
These results provide no clear policy recommendations regarding experience rating. A system with a greater degree of experience rating may lead to less variability in employment over the business cycle than would a system with a lower degree of experience rating. An evaluation of which approach is preferable should, therefore, depend upon the average level of employment over the entire business cycle in the two systems. A higher level of employment, on average, in a system with less experience rating may compensate for the greater employment variability. Unfortunately, not enough research has been conducted to date to fully inform a policy conclusion here.
NOTES
I would like to thank Patty Anderson, Rob Pavosevich, and Bruce Vavnchek for comments on a draft of this chapter, Tara Gustafson for outstanding research assistance, and Mike Miller of the Unemployment Insurance Service for his help in obtaining some of the data used in the analysis 1 For more thorough discussions of the institutional features of UI financing, see Blaustem, Cohen and Haber (1993 ) or Vroman (1986 .
2. Of this federal tax, 0.2 percent was originally imposed in 1977 as a temporary surcharge to build up reserves in an extended benefit trust fund It has been in place ever since.
3 These statistics are obtained from the U.S Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (1983 and more recent supplements)
4 An alternative measure of the UI system's financial status is the high cost multiple, which expresses the fund reserves as a fraction of the highest 12-month benefit payout in the state's his tory. Trends in this measure are similar to those shown in figure 8.1 and are discussed in chapter 9 of this volume.
5. Part of this increase may be explained by 1985 changes in federal guidelines that raised the federal unemployment tax to 6 2 percent and the tax credit to 5 4 percent for those states whose maximum tax rate was at least 5 4 percent This change came in response to the large number of state systems that were insolvent, indicating that many states would have had to increase tax rates anyway Therefore, a hypothetical illustration of changes in state tax schedules over this period without the alteration in federal policy would have likely looked similar.
6 As noted earlier, this experience is partly attributable to short-term problems in the EB sys tem that imposed the entire cost of benefits paid beyond the standard exhaustion period on the fed eral government. In recent recessions, the cost was split by the state and federal governments, imposing a far greater burden on state trust funds, this will probably also be true in the future.
7 Other measures of generosity, which are not explored in detail here, include the potential duration of benefits and the percentage of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits. On these scales, benefits have become less generous over time 8. Anderson and Meyer (1994) examine the incidence of the UI payroll tax and find that most of the tax is borne by firms 9 Results would be somewhat different for states that have chosen to increase their taxable wage base above the federally mandated level One can interpret the numbers provided here as representing workers who live in states like California or New York that have maintained their tax able wage base at this level 10. Details regarding other types of systems and an extended discussion of many issues in UI financing can be found in Becker (1972) .
11. A similar analysis could be reported for a firm in a benefit ratio state but is omitted in this case for the purposes of brevity. See Card and Levine (1994) for a more formal treatment of the material presented here.
12. In fact, if the slope is "steep enough," it is possible for the MTC to be greater than unity. 13. Card and Levine (1992) also present an analysis of this problem, although one which is not as complete as that in Anderson and Meyer (1994) 354 Financing Benefit Payments 14. In fact, this effect is institutionalized in many states that have adopted a series of tax schedules. The particular tax schedule in effect at a point in time is a function of the size of the UI trust fund at that time. As the trust fund is drawn down during a recession, tax schedules increase.
15. The implications of increasing the federal taxable wage base have been addressed in detail by Cook et al. (1995) .
Federal Unemployment Tax Act
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (PUTA) tax is a national payroll tax collected by the Internal Revenue Service. The FUTA tax plays three different roles in the UI system. The first one, as has been discussed, is to provide a pow erful incentive for states to legislate a UI system that conforms to federal re quirements. This is accomplished by giving a large tax credit to employers in states with approved systems. The second role, which will be discussed further, is to provide a repayment mechanism for loans to states.
The third role is to provide financing for certain costs of the system. The items funded by the FUTA tax include UI administration, at both the federal and state levels, most federal and state Employment Service costs, veterans employment programs, labor market information programs, collection of the FUTA tax, management of the Unemployment Trust Fund, the federal share of federal-state Extended Benefits (EB), a portion of outlays under temporary re cessionary benefit extensions, and loans to states.
The current FUTA tax rate is 6.2 percent, payable on the first $7,000 of a worker's wages in a calendar year. Under normal conditions, employers re ceive a 5.4 percent tax credit, leaving a net effective tax rate of 0.8 percent of taxable wages. Appendix 
General Revenues
Although the UI system is basically an employer-financed program, federal general revenues also play a role. In terms of size, one of the most important items funded from general revenues is all or part of the cost of temporary ben efit extensions, which are enacted by the Congress to provide additional bene fits during economic downturns. These benefits, which are typically 100 percent federally funded, may be financed by either the FUTA tax or general revenues or both. The deciding factor usually has been whether or not suffi cient FUTA funds are available in the extended benefit account. General reve nues are used indirectly to pay for benefits for ex-federal workers and exservicemen, via reimbursements by the affected agencies. General revenues are used to pay for special programs that affect targeted groups, such as benefits under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. General revenues also 358 come into play as a borrowing source when the federal accounts are insolvent. In the past, general revenues were also used to pay for such temporary pro grams as Special Unemployment Assistance (SUA) in the mid-1970s.
The Federal Accounts
There are four federal accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) that are used to provide federal financing. Some funding is also done0 directly through an appropriation.
Employment Security Administration Account
The Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA) account is used to fund the administrative costs of the UI system and of other related employ ment security programs. Virtually all of the income to this account is from the FUTA tax. Items funded include all costs of UI administration at both federal and state levels. At the state level, in addition to UI administration, this account funds 97 percent of state Employment Service costs, two veterans employment programs, and labor market information programs run by the states for the Bu reau of Labor Statistics. At the federal level, this account pays for all Depart ment of Labor activities related to employment security programs. In addition, Treasury administrative costs related to collecting the FUTA tax and to man aging and investing the UTF are charged to the ESAA account.
Extended Unemployment Compensation Account
The Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA) pays for the federal share (50 percent) of benefit outlays under the permanent federal-state EB program. FUTA receipts are used for this purpose. EUCA is also used to fund temporary recessionary benefit programs, such as the recent Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program. Whether FUTA or general revenues are used to fund these programs, all funds flow through this account.
Federal Unemployment Account
The Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) provides loans to states under Title XII of the Social Security Act. All state loan repayments, either voluntary or through FUTA credit reductions, are deposited in this account, as are interest payments.
Each of these first three accounts (ESAA, EUCA, and FUA) earns interest at the same rate as is true for the state trust fund accounts. When any of these three accounts becomes insolvent, it may borrow interest-free from one of the other two. Interaccount borrowing first became effective in 1993. If the other accounts do not have sufficient balances to allow this, funds may be borrowed from general revenues, with interest. 359 
Federal Employees Compensation Account
The Federal Employees Compensation Account (FECA) acts as a revolving fund to pay for two federal programs, Unemployment Compensation for Fed eral Employees (UCFE) and Unemployment Compensation for ex-Servicemen (UCX). States draw from this account to pay benefits, then provide information to the U.S. Department of Labor, which in turn bills the appropriate agencies on a quarterly basis. Reimbursements from the agencies then flow into the FE CA. General revenue advances may be made to the account if it becomes insol vent. These do not have to be repaid until the FECA balance is considered to exceed future needs.
Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances
Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances (FUBA) is an appropria tion, rather than a trust fund account. Currently, this appropriation is used to fund benefits (after UI exhaustion) and training for import-impacted workers under the Trade Act. This appropriation has in the past been used to pay for a variety of federal benefit programs, including benefits for workers displaced by Redwood Park expansion, and benefits to Public Service Employment partici pants.
Account Flows and Ceilings
FUTA receipts currently flow into two accounts, ESAA and EUCA (appen dix figure 8.2). FUA also took in a share of FUTA receipts for three years, cal endar years [1988] [1989] [1990] , but currently gets only those receipts attributable to reduced credits for loan repayment. Eighty percent of FUTA receipts are re tained in ESAA, with the remaining 20 percent going to EUCA. The distribu tion of FUTA receipts has been changed a number of times over the years. Appendix table 8.1 shows the history of this distribution since EUCA was es tablished in 1970.
At the end of each fiscal year, a ceiling is applied to every account, and ex cess balances are transferred out (appendix figure 8.2). For ESAA, the ceiling is 40 percent of the spending of the current year from the account. For EUCA and FUA, the ceilings are percentages of total Ul-covered wages, one-half and one-quarter of 1 percent, respectively. The procedure for transferring excess balances is that first, EUCA and FUA balances are checked and any excesses are transferred to ESAA. Then, if ESAA has an excess, that excess is trans ferred to EUCA to the extent that account is below its ceiling. The remaining excess, if any, is transferred to FUA to the extent that account is below its ceil ing. In the event that all three accounts are at their ceilings at the end of a fis cal year, the remaining excess is distributed to state trust fund accounts in proportion to FUTA taxable wages by state. This is called a Reed Act distribu- If ESAA, EUCA, and FUA are over ceiling on October 1, the excess funds are distributed to state trust fund accounts.
*Effective tax rate, after 5 4% is offset against 6.2% federal unemployment tax. Effective rate will drop to 0 6% on January 1, 1999.
tion. A Reed Act distribution has occurred only three times, all in the mid1950s. These funds, although residing in the state trust fund accounts, may be used for UI program administration.
Title XII Loans
An important aspect of federal financing is the Title XII loan system. Loans are available to states without any qualifying requirements other than insolven cy. States apply to the U.S. Department of Labor and are approved for specific amounts, but loans are made only to the extent a state's balance falls below zero on any given day. Loan funds come from the FUA account. Since 1982, interest has been charged on loans, except those that are repaid within the same fiscal year. The interest rate is equal to the average rate earned by the UTF during the last quarter of the prior year.
Repayments are made in one of two ways. The state may transfer monies from its trust fund account to the FUA account. Alternatively, there is an auto matic repayment mechanism that operates via the FUTA credit. In the third year of a loan, the 5.4 percent tax credit is reduced by 0.3 percent, making the effective FUTA tax rate 1.1 percent for employers in the affected state. The amount of receipts attributable to the credit reduction goes to the FUA account and reduces the state's outstanding loan balance. In subsequent years, as long as there is a loan outstanding, the credit is reduced by greater and greater amounts. The basic increment is 0.3 percent per year, but this can be varied us ing a calculation involving the state's average tax rate and benefit cost rate. To add further complexity, there are provisions for several types of tax relief. To receive relief for its employers, the state must apply to the U.S. Department of Labor and meet certain criteria related to solvency.
